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Abstract:
This essay deals with real convergence in the European Union (EU). Real convergence is here
defined as convergence of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standard. I examine whether
there is empirical evidence of real convergence among EU countries or regions and if the
current effort towards nominal convergence has slowed real convergence. The main findings
are that there has been some real convergence at the country level, mainly before the mid-
1970s, but not much evidence of real convergence is found at the regional level. I also find
that the convergence criteria set in the Treaty of Maastricht may have slowed real convergence
in the European Union.
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11 INTRODUCTION
This essay deals with real convergence among the member countries of the European
Union (EU). Real convergence is here defined as convergence of Gross Domestic Product per
capita (GDPpc) in Purchasing Power Standard (PPS). I measure it four ways. Real
convergence occurs if (1) poorer countries or regions are growing faster than rich ones; (2) if
the dispersion of GDPpc is decreasing over time; (3) if country or regional rankings of GDPpc
are not persistent; or (4) if the regional distribution of GDPpc is evolving towards an increased
concentration at the center (at the EU average).
Using these measures, I investigate whether there is evidence of real convergence
among EU countries or regions and if the current efforts towards nominal convergence slowed
real convergence in the EU. As some of the poorer countries in the EU were also the ones
farther away from fulfilling the convergence criteria set in the Maastricht Treaty, it is possible
that the restraints they imposed on monetary and fiscal policy have slowed growth in these
countries and thus interfered with real convergence in the EU as a whole.
The main findings are that there is some evidence of real convergence at the country
level, mainly before the mid-1970s, but not much evidence of real convergence is found at the
regional level. I also find that the criteria set in the Treaty of Maastricht may have slowed real
convergence in the European Union at the country and regional levels.
2 EVOLUTION OF GDPPC IN PPS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE EUROPEAN AVERAGE
Figure 1 shows the evolution of GDPpc in PPS, as a percentage of the EU average,
from 1960 to 1997. It gives a rough idea of convergence of GDP per capita (real
convergence) across the 15 EU members, and makes it easy to identify the richest and poorest
countries. Although Luxembourg has always been the richest country and Portugal and Greece
2the two poorest, some convergence has occurred. First, all the countries that had GDP per
capita below the EU average in 1960 are now above it or much closer. The most spectacular
recoveries were those of Ireland and Portugal, with increases of 42.7 and 29.8 percentage
points, respectively.1 Second, Sweden and the UK, the second and third richest in 1960, are
slightly below the EU average in 1997, with decreases of 25.9 and 23.5 percentage points,
respectively. Finally, Germany, the second richest during the 1980s, had a considerable drop in
GDP per capita after its reunification.
                                               
1 For an analysis of recent economic performances, see: European Commission (1996b) for Ireland, and
European Commission (1997b) for Portugal. For a study on Portugal-EU convergence, see: Barros and
Garoupa (1996).
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Figure 1: Evolution of GDP per capita in PPS as a percentage of the European average
33 GROWTH OF GDP PER CAPITA (b CONVERGENCE)
3.1 Convergence among countries
Absolute convergence of GDP per capita occurs if poor countries grow faster than rich
ones. The most common way to check for convergence of GDPpc among a group of countries
is to estimate a regression of growth of GDPpc over a certain period on the initial level of
GDPpc. Baumol (1986), De Long (1988), Barro (1991), and many others, estimated
convergence equations over cross-sections of countries.2 Most studies find results consistent
with those of Barro (1991), who finds evidence of convergence of GDPpc for OECD
countries but not for the entire world, for which there is some evidence of divergence. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1996a,b) find evidence of convergence for
European regions, U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and Japanese prefectures.
One problem with cross-sectional studies is that estimated convergence rates may be
affected by cyclical fluctuations of GDPpc, in the sense that the choice of the starting and
ending dates for the periods under analysis may influence results. Another problem is that they
only take cross-sectional variation into account, ignoring the dynamic (time) variation. Those
problems can be somewhat mitigated by estimating a panel regression. A panel regression
takes both dimensions into account (cross-section and time), and thus its estimates may be less
affected by cyclical fluctuations of GDPpc. Furthermore, cross-sectional estimations of
convergence with just 15 countries would have very low power. However, I also handle the
cyclical influence on convergence by testing for convergence using the trend component of
GDPpc, estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott decomposition method. Results obtained when
                                               
2 Studies focusing on GDPpc convergence (b convergence) include, among others: Barro (1991), Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1995), Baumol (1986), Ben David (1993,1996), Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996), De
Long (1988), Islam (1995), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), and Sala-i-Martin (1996a,b).
4using the trend component of GDPpc are not exactly equal to those obtained when using
GDPpc itself, but conclusions regarding real convergence in Europe do not change.3
In my tests for absolute convergence, I follow Ben-David (1993, 1996), using a
convergence equation that is a Dickey-Fuller test on the log of GDPpc relative to the mean of
the group under consideration. The only difference is that my equation includes a constant.
Table 1 reports the results of a regression of annual growth of GDPpc in PPS, as a percentage
of the EU average, on lagged GDPpc (also in PPS and as a percentage of the EU average) and
a constant, for a panel of the 15 EU countries from 1960 to 1997. Since the equation adopted
here is that of a Dickey-Fuller unit root test, statistical significance is evaluated using Dickey-
Fuller critical values instead of those of the T-Student distribution.4
When no country effects are assumed, European countries’ GDP per capita converged
at an average rate of roughly 2.3% a year, that is, the average disparity was cut by 2.3% a
year. The half-life, the number of years required for the average disparity to be cut in half, is
approximately 30 years. Thus, there is some evidence of absolute convergence of GDPpc for
EU countries. Then, the sample was split into sub-periods using the following break points:
1973, first oil shock and the UK, Denmark, and Ireland join the European Community (EC);
and 1986, Single European Act and Portugal and Spain join the EC. The third sub-period
(1986-97) was divided into before and after Maastricht (1986-91 and 1992-97, respectively).
For two of the sub-periods, some evidence of absolute convergence remains. Chow tests, not
reported here, always reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients in all sub-periods.
                                               
3 Results obtained when using the trend component of GDPpc are not shown here. See Veiga (1998).
4 A time trend and lags of the dependent variable were not statistically significant when included in the
regressions (results not shown here).
5Table 1: Convergence of GDPpc for EU countries
No country effects Random Effects
Time Period b Half-Life b Half-Life
1960-97 -.0229*** 29.9 -.0245*** 27.9
1960-72 -.0331*** 19.5 -.0340*** 20.0
1973-85 -.0074 93.3 -.0125 55.1
1986-97 -.0225* 31.2 -.0245 27.9
1986-91 -.0296 23.1 -.0297 23.0
1992-97 -.0142 48.5 -.0336 20.3
Source: Author’s calculations using European Commission (1997a).
Notes: - The following equation was estimated by OLS:
ln(yi,t / yi,t-1 ) = a + b ln(yi,t-1 ) + eit
where yi,t stands for relative GDPpc of country i at time t, and eit
is a white noise error term. A country-specific error term is
added when assuming random effects;
- The number of stars indicates the significance level at which the
relevant null hypothesis is rejected: “***” for 1%, “**” for 5%, and
“*” for 10% (Dickey-Fuller critical values were used);
- The half-life is equal to: ln (.50)/ ln (1+b).
One problem with the panel analysis above is that there may be country effects in the
error term. Statistically, these individual country effects may be treated as fixed or random. If
they are treated as fixed, the identification of b will rely solely on variation in incomes within
countries, and no information from cross-country differences in average growth rates and
incomes will be used. The problem with that approach when testing for convergence is that it
implies that countries may be converging to different points. This is what Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991, 1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1996a,b) call “conditional b convergence”. It shows
how fast countries or regions are converging to their own steady states.5
                                               
5 One simple way to test for conditional convergence would be to include country dummy variables in the
estimations of Table 1 (controlling for fixed effects).
6But, if steady states differ according to differences in technologies, education, or other
characteristics, countries or regions may be converging to different levels of GDPpc. Income
gaps among them may never be eliminated even in the presence of a rate of conditional
convergence of 2% per year that Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1996a,b)
find for different groupings of regions and different time periods. Furthermore, according to
Quah (1996a,b,c,d and 1997) and Galor (1996), conditional convergence may not avoid
persistence, stratification, and the formation of convergence clubs, with countries
concentrating into groups of rich and poor. Since my primary concern is to find out if poor
countries are catching up with richer ones, conditional convergence is irrelevant, and so I will
not treat country effects as fixed.
The alternative is to view country effects as random. Instead of estimating a set of
given (unknown) constants for each of the countries, a single intercept is estimated; country
effects merely serve to make the error covariance matrix non-diagonal. This model assumes
that country specific constant terms are randomly distributed across cross-sectional units, and
uncorrelated with the other regressors. The error covariance matrix will now reflect the fact
that the error term for each country may be correlated over time. Ignoring the presence of
random effects can lead to biased statistical inference in OLS regressions. Unlike in the fixed
effects model, cross-country variations in the variables are used in estimating b. As country
effects are not directly estimated, it is implicitly assumed that countries are not converging to
different steady states. Thus, assuming country effects to be random rather than fixed seems to
be appropriate when testing for absolute convergence.
Results of convergence estimations when accounting for random effects are shown in
the right panel of Table 1. Results are very similar to those of the left panel, except for 1986-
97, for which the null hypothesis of a unit root is no longer rejected. In general, estimated
coefficients get slightly higher in absolute value and half-lives slightly lower. The annual rate
7of convergence for 1960-97 is now 2.45% and the half-life is around 28 years. Since the only
sub-period for which there is evidence of convergence is 1960-72, it seems that most of the
real convergence found for 1960-97 happened before 1973.
Table 1 shows evidence of convergence of GDPpc relative to the EU average for the
entire time period considered (1960-97). Thus, countries’ GDPpc seem to be converging
towards the average. But, this is not enough to know whether each country is approaching a
steady state or not. For that, one needs to analyze the behavior of the EU average. That is
done in Figure 2, which shows the evolution of real GDPpc in PPS (and its natural log) for the
EU average (the thick line) and for all member countries. Although most of the countries
concentrate around the average (especially for log of GDPpc), there are some outliers:
Luxembourg, which does not seem to be converging, and Spain, Greece, and Portugal, which
are converging slowly. Ireland is an interesting case, since it had a GDPpc below that of Spain
until 1990, and is now slightly above the EU average.
Real GDPpc in PPS
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Figure 2: Evolution of Real GDP per capita in PPS in the EU
8Except in the beginning of the 1990s, the EU average GDPpc followed a pattern of
continued growth, with an average annual rate of growth of approximately 3% for the entire
period. The level reached in 1997 is almost three times higher than that of 1960. The same can
be said about most countries. Thus, EU countries seem to be converging to an ever-increasing
average instead of approaching a steady state.
3.2 Convergence among regions
Although results above show some evidence in favor of convergence among EU
countries, the same may not necessarily happen at the regional level. That is, we still do not
know if there is regional convergence at the EU level, or at the country level. Table 2 shows
the results of panel estimations of convergence equations (assuming random effects) for 77
NUTS I regions and 206 NUTS II regions from 1977 to 1995 and several sub-periods.6
As done above, annual growth of GDPpc in PPS as a percentage of the EU average is
regressed on lagged GDPpc (also as a percentage of the EU average) and a constant. Data on
regions of the former East Germany are not available before 1991, and these regions benefited
from an unusual amount of aid from the former West Germany that may justify their fast
convergence. Since this may drive the results for the whole EU in favor of convergence at the
regional level, I also report the results obtained when the regions of the former East Germany
are excluded from the sample (“No East GE”). Finally, I report the results of convergence
equations for countries, so that convergence across countries and regions can be compared.
                                               
6 “NUTS” is a classification scheme for European regions into statistical territorial units. The 15 EU member
countries are divided, for statistical purposes, into 77 NUTS I regions or, even further, into 206 NUTS II
regions. They can also be divided into NUTS III regions, but since data on GDPpc before the late 1980s is not
available for many of these regions, NUTS III regions were not considered in this paper. Eurostat's Regio
database provides data on GDPpc in PPS for the EU as a whole, for countries, and for regions (NUTS I, NUTS
II, and NUTS III). GDPpc in PPS as a percentage of the EU average is obtained by dividing the GDPpc of the
country or region in question by that of the EU as a whole, and multiplying that ratio by 100.
9Table 2: Convergence of GDPpc for EU regions and countries
1977-95 1977-85 1986-95 1986-91 1992-95
b Half
Life
b Half
Life
b Half
Life
b Half
Life
b Half
Life
NUTS I -.068*** 9.8 -.0088 78.4 -.0905*** 7.3 -.0297*** 23.0 -.1283*** 5.0
No East GE -.0146*** 47.1 -.0088 78.4 -.0231*** 29.7 -.0297*** 23.0 -.0128* 53.8
NUTS II -.0438*** 15.4 -.0176*** 39.0 -.0576*** 11.6 -.0374*** 18.1 -.0638*** 10.5
No East GE -.0218*** 31.4 -.0176*** 39.0 -.0288*** 23.7 -.0374*** 18.1 -.0155*** 44.3
COUNTRIES -.0139 49.2 -.0104 65.6 -.0252 27.1 -.0297 23.0 -.0276 24.7
Source: Author’s calculations using Eurostat (1998), REGIO Regional Database.
Notes: - Results were obtained estimating the following equation:
ln(yi,t / yi,t-1 ) = a + b ln(yi,t-1 ) + ui + eit
where yi,t stands for the GDP of region i relative to the EU average at time t, ui is
a country specific error term, and eit is the general error term;
- The half-life is equal to  ln (.50) / ln (1+b);
- The number of stars indicates the significance level at which the relevant null hypothesis is
rejected: “***” for 1%, “**” for 5%, and “*” for 10% (for DF critical values);
- “No East GE” means that the regions of the former East Germany were excluded from the sample.
There is evidence of convergence of GDPpc among EU regions for the period 1977-
95. Estimated coefficients are always statistically significant, and have a negative sign (as
expected) in all four estimations. When all regions are included, panel estimations show annual
convergence rates of roughly 7% for NUTS I regions and 4% for NUTS II regions, with half-
lives around 10 and 15 years, respectively. This means that at the highest level of
disaggregation (NUTS II) it would take around 15 years to cut the average disparity in half.
When the five regions of the former East Germany are excluded, convergence is much slower
and half-lives jump to around 47 years for NUTS I regions and 31 years for NUTS II regions.
The two sub-periods show very different results. In the first (1977-85), estimated coefficients
are not statistically significant at the NUTS I level and they are smaller in absolute value than
for the entire period at the NUTS II level. Consequently, half-lives are longer. The opposite
10
happens in the second period (1986-95), which shows faster convergence and shorter half-
lives than for the entire period.
Results for the period after Maastricht (1992-95) are also very sensitive to the
inclusion of East German regions. When they are included, convergence is faster after
Maastricht than before for NUTS I and NUTS II regions. When these regions are excluded
from the sample (“No East GE”), convergence is slower after 1992 than before. Thus, it seems
that, except for East German regions, the real convergence of European regions slowed after
the Maastricht Treaty (half-lives are around 20 years for 1986-91 and above 40 years for
1992-95).
No evidence for convergence among countries is found for any of the periods
considered. This is consistent with the results presented in Table 1 in which no evidence of
convergence was found for the periods starting after 1972. Failure to reject the null hypothesis
may also be due to the fact that the number of observations is much smaller for countries than
for regions. The implied half-lives are close to those of the NUTS I regions when the regions
of the former East Germany are excluded.
The previous table shows that there has been some convergence of GDPpc among
regions of the EU. But, it is also important to find out whether regions within each country
have converged with each other. Table 3 shows the results of panel estimates of convergence
equations (assuming random effects) for NUTS I and NUTS II regions within each country
from 1977 to 1995. As in the previous regressions, annual GDPpc growth was regressed on
lagged GDPpc and a constant (with GDPpc in PPS now expressed as a percentage of the
country average). The number of regions per country is indicated in the second column, and
when data is not available since 1977 the starting date is indicated in parentheses. Half-lives
are reported only for those cases in which the estimated coefficient on lagged GDPpc is
11
statistically significant and has a negative sign (the cases in which there is evidence of
convergence).
Table 3: Convergence within regions of the same country
1977-95 1977-85 1986-95
# Reg. b Half-Life b Half-Life b Half-Life
NUTS I:
BE 3 .0008 .014 -.0089
GE (1978) 16 -.139*** 4.6 -.0174 -.148*** 4.3
West GE 11 -.035 -.0174 -.083
GR 4 -.101** 6.5 -.148** 4.3 -.022
ES (1980) 7 -.037 -.0045 -.015
FR 9 -.012 .0084 -.0124* 55.6
IT 11 -.0087 -.0162 -.0069
NE 4 -.058 .033 -.489*** 1.0
UK 11 -.0151 -.014 -.014
NUTS II:
BE 11 -.0083 .0031 -.017
GE (1978) 36 -.120*** 5.4 -.030 -.136*** 4.7
West GE 31 -.036* 18.9 -.030 -.081*** 8.2
GR 13 -.074*** 9.0 -.077 -.055
ES (1980) 18 -.050** 13.5 -.041 -.048* 14.1
FR 26 -.0206** 33.3 -.013 -.0175* 39.3
IT 20 -.029* 23.6 -.038 .0031
NE 12 -.053** 12.7 .023 -.403*** 1.3
AU (1988) 9 -.0077 -.0077
PO (1980) 7 -.154* 4.1 -.063 -.163
FIN (1988) 6 -.0212 -.0212
SW (1985) 8 -.0193 -.0193
UK 35 -.0198 34.7 -.0099 -.0052
Source: Author’s calculations using Eurostat (1998), REGIO Regional Database.
Notes: - The following equation was estimated for each country (assuming random effects):
ln(yi,t / yi,t-1 ) = a + b ln(yi,t-1 ) + ui + eit
where yi,t stands for the GDP of region i relative to the country average at time t, ui  is the
region-specific error term, and eit is the general error term;
- The number of stars indicates the significance level at which the relevant null hypothesis is
rejected: “***” for 1%, “**” for 5%, and “*” for 10% (for Dickey-Fuller critical values);
- The half-life is equal to:  ln (.50) / ln (1+b);
- When data is not available since 1977, the starting date is indicated in parenthesis;
- “West GE” stands for Germany without the regions of the East.
Convergence equations were also computed for the former West Germany (“West
GE”). As Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg are not divided into regions, convergence
equations could not be estimated for these countries, nor for Sweden at the NUTS I level.
12
Reduced number of regions and lack of data for earlier years would also lead to a very small
number of observations for Austria, Finland, and Portugal at the NUTS I level.
Table 3 shows evidence of convergence at the NUTS I level for only two countries,
Germany and Greece. At the NUTS II level, some evidence of convergence is found for 7 out
of 12 countries, but for two of these the estimated coefficient on lagged GDPpc is only
marginally significant. Furthermore, there is weaker evidence of convergence in Germany
when the regions of the East are excluded. As in the previous tables, convergence seems to be
higher and half-lives shorter after 1986 than before. In short, there is not much evidence of
convergence of GDPpc among regions of the same country.
4 DISPERSION OF GDP PER CAPITA (s CONVERGENCE)
While b convergence deals with the speed at which poorer countries or regions catch
up with rich ones, s convergence7 deals with the dispersion of GDP per capita across them.
Evidence of convergence is found when the dispersion of real GDP per capita falls over time.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the standard deviations of GDPpc relative to the EU average
for EU countries and regions. At the country level, this indicator of divergence shows a
declining pattern from 1960 to 1997, which supports the hypothesis of s convergence among
EU countries.
That decreasing pattern of divergence is not found at the regional level, except after
1991. Standard deviations are relatively stable from 1977 to 1990. Then, there is an increase
around 1990 because of the inclusion of the regions of the former German Democratic
Republic, followed by a steady decrease, as those regions converge with the rest of Germany
and with the EU. This may seem strange, as some evidence of convergence at the regional
                                               
7 See: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1995), and Sala-i-Martin (1996a,b).
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level was found in most of the estimations of the last section. It does not necessarily mean that
the results are wrong because, as Sala-i-Martin (1996a,b) explains, b convergence is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for s convergence.
Part of the contrasting evidence regarding convergence at the country and regional
levels may be explained by the shorter time period available for the latter. Standard deviations
at the country level seem to be declining at a faster pace before the  mid-1970s than afterwards
(which is consistent with the results of Table 1 and Table 2 and with those of Ben-David
(1993)). In fact, the standard deviation of GDPpc relative to the EU average, is relatively
stable in the last 20 years (1977-97), which is consistent with the findings at the regional level.
Different results for countries and regions may also be found when regions within
countries are not converging with each other. That is, if countries are converging but regions
within each country are growing apart, dispersion measures may be decreasing at the country
level but not at the regional level. Figure 4 shows the evolution of standard deviation of GDP
per capita as a percentage of the country mean for 12 EU countries (those that have regions at
the NUTS II level).
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Figure 3: Standard deviations of GDPpc in the EU
14
The Netherlands, and reunited Germany (GE+)8, are the only cases in which there is
clear evidence of s convergence among regions. Some convergence seems to have taken place
in Greece, but only until 1982. For Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, West Germany (WGE),
Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, standard deviations are relatively stable over time,
ending with levels close to those at which they started (although slightly higher in most of
them). Spain and Portugal are more unstable but they also end up almost at the level of 1980.
                                               
8 The former West Germany (WGE) and reunited Germany (GE+) are shown separately so that their different
behavior can be compared, and because no data on the regions of the former East Germany are available before
1991. While convergence of GDPpc is evident for the entire Germany, the opposite seems to happen among the
regions of the former West Germany (the standard deviation of GDPpc increases slightly after 1991).
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Figure 4: Standard deviation of GDPpc relative to country mean
(NUTS II regions)
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Overall, it seems that for most of the EU countries there is no evidence of s
convergence among their regions in the time period considered, which may help explain the
lack of convergence for the entire EU at the regional level. This result contrasts with the
findings of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1996a,b) that found
evidence of s convergence among regions within some European countries. This difference of
results may be due to the fact that I work with regions at a more desaggregated level and that
my regional sample starts in 1977 (instead of 1950). In fact, the above-mentioned studies do
not show much evidence of s convergence within EU countries after 1977.
5 TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS
Quah (1996b) argues that the concepts of b and s convergence may not capture the
most important information regarding convergence, which is how one part of the distribution
is behaving relative to another. First, cross-section and panel regressions can represent only
average behavior, not the behavior of an entire distribution. Second, standard deviations do
not capture the transition dynamics, especially information on the persistence of rankings and
switching of ranks. Thus, besides checking whether poorer countries are growing faster than
rich ones, or if income dispersion is decreasing, it is also important (or even more important)
to find out if country and regional rankings are persistent, and to analyze the evolution of the
distribution of relative GDP per capita.
5.1 Country and regional rankings and transition matrices
Table 4 shows the evolution of country rankings from 1960 to 1997. Although
Luxembourg is always the richest country, there is some trading of places going on, especially
in the middle of the scale. Comparing the first year with the last, “ch(60-97)”, the major
16
“losers” are Sweden and the United Kingdom, and the major “winners” are Belgium, Austria,
and Ireland. Ireland’s and Sweden’s performances from 1990 to 1997 are the most
astonishing, with the former jumping five places in the scale and the latter losing seven places.
Spearman correlation coefficients for the five years shown against 1960 are reported in the last
column. Correlations are usually high, and the null hypothesis of no correlation between the
rankings was always rejected. Thus, although there is some movement along the scale, country
rankings in the EU show some degree of persistence.
Table 4: Evolution of country rankings (1960-97)
BE DK GE GR SP FR IRL IT LU NL AT PO FIN SW UK S. Corr
1960 8 5 4 14 13 7 12 11 1 6 9 15 10 2 3 1***
1970 8 4 3 14 12 5 13 10 1 6 9 15 11 2 7 .95***
1980 5 8 2 14 12 3 13 9 1 7 6 15 11 4 10 .81***
1990 7 6 2 15 12 3 13 8 1 10 5 14 9 4 11 .76***
1997 3 2 5 15 13 6 8 9 1 7 4 14 12 11 10 .61**
average 7 4 3 14 12 5 13 9 1 7 7 15 11 4 8
stdev 2 1 1 0.6 0 2 1 1 0 2 2 0.4 1 3 2
ch(60-97) 5 3 -1 -1 0 1 4 2 0 -1 5 1 -2 -9 -7
Source: Author’s calculations using European Commission (1997a).
Notes: - countries were ranked in descending order (richest = 1, poorest = 15);
- “S. Corr” is the Spearman Correlation Coefficient of the rankings of the respective year with those
of 1960. The null hypothesis of zero correlation is rejected at a significance level of: ***=1%, and
**=5%;
- averages and standard deviations are based on yearly rankings of countries and not just on the 5
years reported in the upper part of the table.
Table 5: Spearman correlation coefficients for EU regions
NUTS I Regions NUTS II Regions
1977 1981 1988 1995 1977 1981 1988 1995
1977 1 1
1981 .96 1 .95 1
1988 .89 .94 1 .89 .93 1
1995 .81 .83 .84 1 .83 .89 .93 1
Source: Author’s calculations using Eurostat (1998), REGIO Regional Database.
Note: In all cases, the null hypothesis of zero correlation is rejected at the 1% significance level.
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Table 5 shows matrices of Spearman correlation coefficients for EU NUTS I and
NUTS II regions. Again, coefficients are usually very high (the smallest is .81), and the null
hypothesis of no correlation is always rejected at the 1% significance level. Thus, it seems that
the degree of persistence of regional rankings is very high.
Another way of evaluating the persistence of regional rankings is to divide the regions
into quintiles or income categories in the beginning of a period, and find out how many stayed
there or moved to another quintile or category after some time. Table 6 shows the transition
matrix of 165 NUTS II regions between 1981 and 19959. In the top panel, regions were sorted
in ascending order according to their relative GDPpc of 1981 and grouped into quintiles.
Then, the same was done for 1995, and the two results were compared in order to find out
how many regions stayed in the same quintile and how many changed to a superior or inferior
quintile. For example, the first row indicates that 33 regions were in the first quintile in 1981.
Of these, 29 remained there, 3 moved to the second quintile, and 1 moved to the third quintile.
In percentages, this means that 88% of the regions starting in the first quintile stayed there,
9% moved to the second quintile, and 3% moved to the third quintile.
The diagonal cells indicate the number or the percentage of regions that stayed in the
same quintile after 14 years. It seems that there is some persistence in the extremes (1st and
5th quintiles), with percentages above 75%, and much more movement in the middle (the
percentage of regions that started and stayed in the 3rd and 4th quintiles is only 36% and 42%,
respectively). One should note that this persistence may happen because regions in the second,
third, and fourth quintiles have very similar GDPpc, meaning that a small variation in these
would make them jump to a different quintile. For those in the first and fifth quintiles, a much
                                               
9 1981 was chosen as the starting date because for previous years there is generally a considerably smaller
number of observations. Transition matrices were not computed for NUTS I regions because of the relatively
reduced number of observations (a maximum of 76).
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bigger variation of GDPpc may be required to jump to a different quintile. Furthermore, the
regions in the extremes can only move in one direction.
Table 6: Transition matrix for NUTS II regions (1981-95)
Number of Regions Percentages
Number Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
33 1 29 3 1 0.88 0.09 0.03
33 2 4 20 8 1 0.12 0.61 0.24 0.03
33 3 8 12 12 1 0.24 0.36 0.36 0.03
33 4 2 10 14 7 0.06 0.30 0.42 0.21
33 5 2 6 25 0.06 0.18 0.76
Number Percent £60 80 100 120 >120 £60 80 100 120 >120
17 £60 8 9 0.47 0.53
27 >60 & £80 3 17 7 0.11 0.63 0.26
65 >80 & £100 5 45 15 0.08 0.69 0.23
41 >100 & £120 10 24 7 0.24 0.59 0.17
15 >120 15 1.00
165 Total95 9 34 62 34 26
Source: Author’s calculations using Eurostat (1998), REGIO Regional Database.
This problem is accounted for in the lower panel of Table 6 where regions were
grouped into income categories (as a percentage of the EU average) instead of quintiles. Now,
the number or regions in each category varies widely, ranging from 17 below 60% of the
average, to 65 between 80% and 100%. There is now an even greater persistence in the
richest income group, but the poorest income group (“<60”) exhibits the lowest persistence of
all: 47% of the regions stayed there, contrasting with the upper panel where 88% of the
regions starting in the lowest quintile stayed there. Thus, it seems that some of the poorest
regions are getting closer to the average GDP per capita in the EU.
In short, there is a considerable degree of persistence in country and regional rankings.
Spearman correlation coefficients never reject the null hypothesis of no correlation, and they
are always very high for EU regions. Although there is some trading of places going on among
countries, especially after 1980, transition matrices for NUTS II regions show a high degree of
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persistence for the first and fifth quintiles and for the highest income category. The poorest
regions are getting closer to the EU average (the number of regions in the poorest income
category decreased) but they do not seem to be going much higher in the ranking.
5.2 Histograms and contour plots
It is also possible to have an idea of the transitional dynamics by analyzing the
evolution of the distribution of relative GDPpc over time. Figure 5 is a sequence of histograms
for GDPpc as a percentage of the EU average for European regions in three different years.
Each histogram has GDP per capita as a percentage of the EU average in the horizontal axis
and the percentage of regions in the vertical axis. For example, in 1981 around 10% of the
NUTS I regions had a GDPpc between 60 and 70 per cent of the EU average and 20% of the
regions were between 80 and 90 per cent of that average. It should also be noted that if
regions were converging towards the EU average, there should be an increasing concentration
in the center and a decreasing concentration in the tails.
For NUTS I regions, the major peak tends to remain around the EU average, but there
is no evidence of a decreasing concentration in the tails. The right tail has been increasing,
especially for values up to 140 per cent of the EU average, and a second peak is becoming
more evident in the left side (around 70). Furthermore, the percentage at the major peak has
not changed much since 1981. Also, a third (but smaller) peak may be emerging around 170%
of the EU average. Thus, just by looking at these three snapshots of the distribution of relative
GDP per capita at the NUTS I level, it seems that there is some clustering outside the center,
or a “twin peaks” evolution like the one Quah (1997) suggests there is for his sample of 105
countries.
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In the histograms of NUTS II regions the second peak, around 60% of the EU
average, is considerably smaller than for NUTS I regions and may be disappearing. The first
peak has generally a higher percentage, and a possible third peak is rather small and is not
becoming more pronounced over time. Thus, it seems that for a greater level of detail there is
not so much evidence in favor of a “twin peaks” evolution.
Figure 5 gives an idea of how the distribution of regional GDPpc looks like in three
different points in time. It would also be useful to represent the evolution of that distribution
for the entire time-period considered in just one picture. That is done for NUTS II regions in
Figure 6, which presents two perspectives of the histograms of GDPpc as a percentage of the
EU average from 1977 to 1995. The distribution of NUTS II regions shows that the highest
percentages tend to stay around the EU average, as peaks stay in line with each other forming
a mountainous ridge. The percentage at the major peak is decreasing and a smaller second
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Figure 5: Histograms of relative GDPpc for NUTS I regions
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peak seems to appear in the later years (after the Maastricht Treaty) around 60% of the EU
average.
Figure 7 shows contour plots of the histograms of relative GDPpc for NUTS I and
NUTS II regions. Since they are just a different way of presenting the information contained in
the last figure, the pattern described above remains. Percentages above 15% tend to be
between 90 and 110 per cent of EU average GDPpc, they are lower than 7.5% for values
above 130, and there is more evidence of a second peak for NUTS I than for NUTS II
regions. It is also worth mentioning that this second peak is more pronounced after the
Maastricht Treaty than before (mainly for NUTS II regions for which evidence of a second
peak appears only after 1992). Although it is hard to know if the distribution for NUTS II
regions is also tending towards twin peakedness, because the small second peak may just fade
away as those regions get richer, it is possible to conclude that there has not been a general
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Figure 6: Histogram of relative GDPpc for NUTS II regions (1977-95)
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tendency of clustering towards the center. In fact, the distribution of relative GDP per capita
of NUTS I and NUTS II regions has not changed significantly over the years.10
In short, the evolution of the distribution of relative GDP per capita among EU regions
does not provide much evidence in favor of convergence. There is no pattern of increased
concentration at the center (around the average) in either of the two distributions, there is
some evidence of “twin-peakedness” for NUTS I regions, and a small second peak seemed to
be emerging in the distribution of relative GDPpc of NUTS II regions after 1992. This is
consistent with the results of the previous section concerning the lack of s convergence at the
regional level.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This essay deals with convergence of GDP per capita in the EU. Convergence
generally happens if GDPpc grows faster in poorer countries or regions than in rich ones (b
                                               
10 For a more sophisticated analysis of transition dynamics see: Quah (1996a,b,c,d and 1997).
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Figure 7: Contour plots for NUTS I and NUTS II regions (1977-95)
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absolute convergence), or if the dispersion of GDPpc across countries or regions is decreasing
(s convergence). Low persistence of country or regional rankings and an evolution of the
distribution of GDPpc towards single-peakedness with concentration at the average are also
consistent with convergence.
There is evidence of b absolute convergence among countries since 1960, with an
estimated annual rate of convergence of 2.45%. This implies that the average disparity of
GDPpc would be cut in half within 28 years. Evidence of convergence for countries is found
only for the sub-period 1960-72, meaning that most of the convergence referred above took
place before 1973. These findings are consistent with those of Ben-David (1993) that found
convergence among EU countries to have been faster before the 1970s than after. According
to him, this was due to the greater extent of trade liberalization that took place during the
1950s and 1960s.
The estimated speed of convergence among regions seems to depend heavily on those
of the former East Germany. When they are excluded from the sample, rates of convergence
get much smaller, resulting in half-lives comparable to or even higher than those for countries.
Convergence also seems to have been slower after Maastricht than before in the estimations
where those regions are excluded.
While there is evidence of s convergence for countries, with standard deviations
decreasing at least until the late 1970s, that happens for regions only after 1991. Again, this is
due to the regions of the former German Democratic Republic. Evidence of convergence for
regions within the same country was not found for most of the EU countries, which may help
explain the different results at the country and regional levels. This result contrasts with the
findings of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1996a,b) that found
evidence of s convergence among regions within some European countries. Part of the
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contrasting evidence can be attributed to the fact that I work with a smaller time period
(starting in 1977 instead of 1950). Most of the evidence of s convergence that those studies
find took place before the mid-1970s. After that, the dispersion of GDPpc is quite stable for
most countries, which is consistent with my results. The remaining differences between their
results and mine may be due to the fact that I work with a larger sample: a larger number of
countries; and generally, more regions per country.
Country and regional rankings show a considerable degree of persistence, and the
regional distribution of GDPpc relative to the EU average looks very stable across time, with
no clear tendency towards increased concentration at the center. On the contrary, a second
peak is found for NUTS I regions and it appears in the last two or three years for NUTS II
regions. In short, there is some evidence of convergence for countries, although rankings are
somewhat persistent, but not for regions.
Finally, it is arguable that the efforts towards inflation reduction and fiscal rectitude
may help explain why convergence of GDP per capita relative to the EU average has been
generally slower after the Treaty of Maastricht than before. As some of the poorest countries
of the EU were also the ones farther away from fulfilling the convergence criteria, the
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies that they had to implement in order to reduce inflation,
budget deficits, and public debt slowed their economic growth and, consequently, the
convergence of GDP per capita in the EU. Although the reduction of inflation, fiscal deficits,
and public debt may be beneficial for economic growth in the long run, that reduction could
probably have been made with smaller economic costs inside a monetary union. That is,
economic growth in Europe could have been faster in the last five years if the convergence
criteria had been dropped and EMU started earlier.
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